Introduction
Existing records on international crimes indicate that it is State officials, and in particular senior officials, who often commit international crimes. 2 In order to avoid the impunity often caused by the failure of States to take action against their own officials and other persons acting on their behalf, 3 States adopted in 1998 the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter referred to as the Rome Statute). The International Criminal Court (hereinafter referred to as the ICC) was
given jurisdiction to try persons accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and, under some conditions, the crime of aggression. 4 Most importantly, the principle that immunities do not apply to proceedings before international tribunals 5 * Evode Kayitana. LLB (National University of Rwanda); LLM (UNISA); LLD (NWU, Potchefstroom). Lecturer in Law, University of Rwanda. Email: ekayitana@yahoo.fr. The author is highly indebted to Prof PG du Toit for his guidance in writing this article. 1
Franey Immunity 27-28. was reaffirmed in this Statute. In this regard, article 27 of the Rome Statute provides as follows:
1.
[T]his Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.
The above provision is a significant tool the ICC was equipped with in order for it to be able to effectively fight against the culture of impunity that has plagued the world in the past. It ensures that persons who commit certain gross human rights violations may, whatever their status in their countries, be brought to trial and be punished for those acts.
Nevertheless, under the so-called "complementarity" regime of the Rome Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC is secondary to the jurisdiction of domestic courts. 6 States Parties, not the ICC, have the primary responsibility of investigating and prosecuting international crimes. The ICC acts only when States are "unable or unwilling" to prosecute. 7 Under this regime, the Rome Statute gives priority to any willing and Van Sliedregt and Stoitchkova "International Criminal Law" 257. 7 To this end, art 17(1)(a) of the Rome Statute provides that a case shall be inadmissible before the ICC where " [T] he case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution". It further provides that a case shall be inadmissible before the ICC if it "has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute" (art 17(1)(b) Rome Statute). With regard to completed trials, the 2563 able State, without requiring any particular link to the crime, including States exercising universal jurisdiction. 8 As a State Party, in order to give effect to the complementarity regime of the Rome Statute, South Africa enacted the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 (hereafter the Implementation Act) which determines the modalities of prosecuting perpetrators of the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (hereafter referred to as international crimes) in South African courts.
The Implementation Act also provides that South African courts will have jurisdiction over these crimes not only when they are committed on the territory of South Africa but also when they are committed outside the Republic. 9 By granting South African courts jurisdiction over a person who commits a crime outside the Republic when that person is later found on South African territory, 10 without regard to that person's nationality or the nationality of the victims, the Implementation Act empowers South African courts with universal jurisdiction over international crimes.
Rome Statute also provides that the ICC may not hear such cases if the person concerned has already been tried for the same conduct by a national court (art 20(2) Rome Statute), unless the national proceedings: " [W] ere for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or [o]therwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with norms of due process recognized by international law and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice". Art 20(3) Rome Statute. Section 4(2)(a) of the Implementation Act provides that: [D] espite any other law to the contrary, including customary and conventional international law, the fact that a person-
is or was a head of State or government, a member of a government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official [...] , is neither-(i) a defence to a crime; nor (ii) a ground for any possible reduction of sentence once a person has been convicted of a crime.
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Most of the South African scholars who have commented on the Implementation Act have interpreted this provision as removing whatever immunity (both functional and 11 Section 4(2) Implementation Act. 2565 personal) foreign officials may have before South African courts. 12 Dugard and Abraham 13 argue that section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Implementation Act represents a choice by the legislature not to follow the "unfortunate" Arrest Warrant decision, "of which it must have been aware". It would be ridiculous, they say, to allow a foreign head of State or government responsible for committing international crimes in his own country to plead immunity before a South African court "when he could not do so before the ICC". 14 In support of this view, Du Plessis 15 says:
In terms of the Act, South African courts, acting under the complementarity scheme, are accorded the same power to "trump" the immunities which usually attach to officials of government as the ICC is by virtue of Article 27 of the Statute.
The above interpretation has also received judicial endorsement in Southern African Immunity ratione materiae is enjoyed by all foreign officials regardless of rank. 37 It may also be relied on by serving State officials as well as by former officials in respect of official acts performed while in office. 38 This is also not affected by the purpose of an official's presence in the territory of the State exercising jurisdiction.
Irrespective of whether this person is abroad on an official visit or is staying there in a private capacity, he enjoys immunity from that State's courts in respect of acts performed in his official capacity in his home State. 39 However, a survey of the literature and the decisions of national courts reveals that immunity ratione materiae applies only in civil cases. It does not apply before the criminal courts of foreign States which have jurisdiction over a crime. 40 With regard to international crimes in particular, the characterisation of such conduct as crimes under international law absolves them from the protection of immunity ratione materiae. 51 This immunity is justified on three grounds, of which none can apply to international crimes. First, immunity ratione materiae is based on the view that all States are equal, and for one State to judge the sovereign actions of another State would be an unacceptable act of interference by that State in the affairs of the other State. 52 Given the egregious nature of international crimes, however, these crimes cannot be considered as an internal matter of any country. These crimes are considered as being committed against the international community as a whole and as being subject to the universal jurisdiction of all States. 53 Secondly, immunity ratione materiae is justified as necessary to protect States' dignity in that it prevents a foreign State from judging another State's conduct. 54 Nevertheless, since international crimes are prohibited by international law, As the House of Lords said in the Pinochet case:
... international law has made plain that certain types of conduct [...] are not acceptable conduct on the part of anyone. That applies as much to heads of State, or even more so, as it does to everyone else; the contrary conclusion would make a mockery of international law.
59
From the perspective of the perpetrator, the removal of immunity ratione materiae in case of serious crimes under international law is also justified because in this area "individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience". 60 He who commits a serious crime under international law cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the State because the State in authorising action "moves outside its competence under International Law". 61 the very conduct which it criminalizes and for which it imposes duties to prosecute". The DRC argued that Belgium had violated its right to conduct its foreign relations through being appropriately represented by its foreign minister. 81 The ICJ held that the absolute nature of the immunity from criminal proceedings in a foreign State accorded to a serving Foreign Minister ratione personae subsists even when it is alleged that he has committed a crime under international law. 82 The ICJ thus affirmed that customary international law precluded national courts from trying high-ranking officials of foreign States, including ministers of foreign affairs, who are required to travel abroad in the performance of their official duties. 87
Some scholars have expressed opposition to the ICJ decision in the Arrest Warrant case. Dugard 88 has described this decision as "controversial, and short-sighted". In particular, Dugard 89 argues that:
... it would be ridiculous to allow a foreign head of state or government responsible for committing genocide in his own country successfully to plead immunity before a South African court when he could not do so before the ICC.
It is submitted that the above argument is not correct because it overlooks the fundamental rationale behind immunity ratione personae. This immunity is necessary for the maintenance of a system of peaceful coexistence and cooperation among
States. Without the guarantee that States' representatives will not be subjected to trial in foreign courts, they may simply choose to stay at home rather than to run the risks of engaging in international diplomacy. 90 As will become clear in the discussion which follows, Du Plessis's argument is based on a wrong interpretation of section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Implementation Act. In the view of the present writer, by employing the words "defence to a crime", the Implementation Act removes only the defence of "official capacity", not immunity, whether functional or personal. This is the interpretation of this section which is consistent with a grammatical 102 approach to statutory interpretation. This argument is elaborated upon below.
The concept of "defence to a crime"
The words "defence to a crime" are found in various treatises on South African criminal law. Snyman 103 states that "every crime has different definitional elements"
and that "defences" are "based upon the absence of a particular element", for example "premises" in housebreaking, "property" in theft, or "judicial proceedings" in perjury. Burchell 104 identifies three general elements of criminal liability as follows: [F] or criminal liability to result, the prosecution (the State) must prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused has committed, (i) a voluntary act which is unlawful (sometimes referred to as actus reus) and that this conduct was accompanied by (ii) criminal capacity and (iii) fault (sometimes referred to as mens rea).
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Burchell 106 then goes to say, like Snyman, that:
[S]outh African criminal law distinguishes between defences to criminal liability on the basis of the element of criminal liability that is excluded by the defence ie defences excluding the unlawfulness of the conduct (ie grounds of justification); 101 Section 232 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) provides that "customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament". 102 Grammatical interpretation tries to find the meaning of a statute from the language of the text. It follows from the above that to interpret the words "defence to a crime" contained in section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Implementation Act as referring both to the jurisdictional defences of immunity ratione materiae and immunity ratione personae is a misunderstanding of these concepts as they are ordinarily used in criminal law.
Immunities (both functional and personal) do not constitute a "defence to a crime"; they prohibit "the exercise of criminal jurisdiction" altogether. 107 These immunities act as "procedural" bars to "prosecution" 108 rather than a "defence to a crime" which can be raised only in the course of the trial once the jurisdictional bar has been lifted. Thus, the only way that the official status of the accused can be pleaded as a "defence to a crime" is when the accused pleads the defence of "official capacity", ie that the act that would otherwise be unlawful is justified if the accused is entitled to perform it by virtue of the office he occupies. 109 Thus, article 27(1) of the Rome Statute clearly envisages the official status of the accused being invoked as a "substantive defence" rather than a "procedural defence", which is dealt with in 27(2). 117 The reference to "criminal responsibility" in article 27(1) bears a striking similarity to the words "defence to a crime" used in the Implementation Act and their corresponding use in Snyman and Burchell's works referred to above. It thus appears that the wording of section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Implementation Act is modelled on article 27(1) of the Rome Statute, which refers to the defence of official capacity, not immunity, ratione materiae and ratione personae, which is dealt with in a separate provision, ie article 27(2). This article (article 27(2)) provides that: The Rome Statute therefore clearly distinguishes between the defence of official capacity on the one hand and the defence of immunity (both ratione materiae and immunity ratione personae) on the other. It is clear that section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Implementation Act was modelled on the first paragraph of article 27, not the second. It thus follows that the words "defence to a crime" contained in section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Implementation Act must be understood as referring to the official status of the accused being pleaded as a substantive defence to a crime (the defence of "official capacity"), rather than being a bar to the proceedings altogether (immunity ratione materiae or ratione personae). This interpretation of section 4(2)(a)(i) is clearly the only one which can be consistent with a grammatical approach to statutory interpretation.
Dugard 118 alludes to the above interpretation, but for reasons that are not correct, concludes that section 4(2)(a)(i) removes both functional and personal immunities.
He says:
This would seem to mean that a head of state or government will not be able to plead immunity in respect of the crimes recognised by the Rome Statute-genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes-unless the word "defence" in s 4(a)(i) is interpreted narrowly to apply only to a substantive defence on the merits of the case and not to a plea to jurisdiction, which would be an untenable interpretation in the light of article 27 of the Rome Statute denying immunity.
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With respect, Dugard's argument does not hold. The fact that the Rome Statute does not recognise any type of immunity before the ICC does not entail the rejection of such immunities in domestic courts even when persons are accused of international crimes. These are different jurisdictions and different rules apply. As stated earlier, 120 it is a settled issue in international law that both immunity ratione materiae and immunity ratione personae do not apply before international criminal 2583 tribunals. However, as stated before, 121 immunity ratione personae (not immunity ratione materiae) applies when international crimes are prosecuted in domestic courts. As the ICJ stated in the Arrest Warrant case, 122 in regard to the immunity ratione personae of a foreign minister:
there exists under customary international law any form of exception to the rule according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.
In the light of the above holding of the ICJ, Dugard's argument that the interpretation that section 4(2)(a)(i) does not remove immunity ratione personae would be an "untenable interpretation in the light of article 27 of the Rome Statute denying immunity" cannot stand. Here, we are dealing with two legal systems:
article 27 of the Rome Statute governs prosecutions before an international criminal tribunal, while section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Implementation Act governs prosecutions in South African courts. On this view, Dugard's argument that section4(2)(a)(i) may not be interpreted in a manner that gives it a different meaning from that found in the provisions of the Rome Statute is not warranted.
Dugard's interpretation of section 4(2)(a)(i) as removing all immunities, in particular personal immunity, is also inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution on the interpretation of statutes. The Constitution provides that:
[W]hen interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.
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Thus, since the Constitution seeks to ensure that South African law will evolve in accordance with international law, 124 Dugard's argument cannot be accepted. 127 Gevers and Kemp et al interpret the words "defence to a crime" contained in s 4(2)(a)(i) of the Implementation Act as referring to immunity ratione materiae. See Gevers 2011 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1975788&download=yes 17 and Kemp et al Criminal Law 588. This, however, is not correct. As stated above, immunity ratione materiae, just as immunity ratione personae, is a procedural defence, not a defence to a crime. It is also worth reminding that immunities (both functional and personal) can be waived by the state to which the official belongs (see para 2.1 above). This is not applicable to the defence of official capacity which belongs to the individual official, not the state.
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foreign States are immune from the criminal (and civil) jurisdiction of the South
African courts "in accordance with the rules of customary international law". 132
As Secondly, the immunity of heads of State, including when they are abroad on private visits, can be justified by the principle of non-intervention, which is the "corollary of the principle of sovereign equality of States". 141 The principle of the sovereign equality of States is enunciated in the UN Charter, where it is provided that the "Organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members". 142 To arrest and detain a head of State is effectively to change the A question that arises here is whether foreign heads of government should also not be granted immunity ratione personae when they are on private visits in South In the Arrest Warrant case, 145 the ICJ took the view that the immunity ratione personae of heads of government also extends to their private visits abroad.
Although the ICJ did not provide any State practice to support its argument, it seems that there are good reasons for extending the immunity of heads of government to their private visits. Although they may not be considered as having the same "majestic dignity" as heads of State, it is the heads of government who in a number of States are the effective leaders of their countries. 146 In some States, when a head of government resigns or is removed from office, the entire government is deemed 2588 to have resigned and a new government must be formed. 147 To arrest and detain in a foreign country a head of government would bring about the same result and would thus amount to a change of the government of his or her State, which would be an impermissible infringement of that State's sovereignty. Therefore, the reasoning of the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case 148 that heads of government, just like heads of State, also enjoy immunity ratione personae on private visits abroad is quite apposite. On this view, it is suggested that South Africa should amend the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act to provide that foreign heads of government are accorded the same immunity as heads of State, including when they are in South Africa on private visits.
It is submitted, however, that the ICJ's view in the Arrest Warrant case 149 that ministers of foreign affairs also enjoy immunity ratione personae even when they are in foreign countries on private visits is not correct. Ministers, including the minister of foreign affairs, may represent the State but do not embody "the supreme authority of the State". 150 Consequently, their arrest on private visits does not significantly offend the dignity of their State and their removal does not signify a change in government of the State. 151 Thus, the ICJ's view in regard to the immunity ratione personae of ministers of foreign affairs seems to be exaggerative. As Cryer 152 notes, there is no state practice, and the ICJ itself did not refer to any, to support such a "sweeping rule". In fact, if one draws an analogy from the law and practice of diplomatic immunities, one must arrive at the conclusion that foreign ministers should not be accorded immunity ratione personae when on holiday or private visit in foreign States. 153 In the area of diplomatic law personal immunity is not accorded to diplomats during holidays in third countries, but only when en poste and during 
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transit between the home country and the host country. 154 There appears to be no reason why ministers of foreign affairs, and all ministers in general, should be subject to a more favourable regime than diplomats. On this note, it must be concluded that the provision of the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act that denies immunity ratione personae to foreign ministers and other low-ranking officials of foreign States who are in South Africa on a private visit does not violate international law. In fact, it must also be noted that the extension of full immunity to private visits is not consistent with the rationale on which the ICJ founded its decision, which was that exposure of a foreign minister to proceedings:
... could deter the Minister from travelling internationally when required to do so for the purposes of the performance of his or her official functions.
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This reasoning is inapplicable to private travel. 156 Thus, as Yitiha 157 says, extending the immunity ratione personae of the minister of foreign affairs (and other ministers in general) to cover them even when they are abroad on private visits would be "erroneous and unjustified". By restricting this immunity to heads of State and heads of government, a balance is struck between the requirements of the sovereign equality and dignity of States on the one hand and the imperatives of respect for human rights on the other. 158
Conclusion
This article has been concerned with the extent to which officials of foreign States can be accorded or denied immunity before South African courts when charged with international crimes committed in foreign States. http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/troika_ua_ue_rapport_competence_universe lle_EN.pdf 42: "Those national criminal justice authorities considering exercising universal jurisdiction over persons suspected of serious crimes of international concern are legally bound to take into account all the immunities to which foreign state officials may be entitled under international law and are consequently obliged to refrain from prosecuting those officials entitled to such immunities". 166 See para 3.2 above. The Implementation Act also provides that South African courts will have jurisdiction over these crimes not only when they are committed on the territory of South Africa but also when they are committed outside the Republic. By granting South African courts jurisdiction over a person who commits a crime outside the Republic when that person is later found on South African territory, without regard to that person's nationality or the nationality of the victims, the Implementation Act empowers South African courts with universal jurisdiction over international crimes. This paper seeks to determine whether and to what extent foreign State officials, such as foreign heads of State, heads of government and ministers of foreign affairs, can plead immunity when they are accused of international crimes before South African courts when exercising their universal jurisdiction in terms of the Implementation Act and in accordance with the complementarity regime of the Rome Statute. In other words, the article endeavours to determine whether * Evode Kayitana. LLB (National University of Rwanda); LLM (UNISA); LLD (NWU/Potchefstroom). Lecturer in Law, University of Rwanda. Email: ekayitana@yahoo.fr. The author is highly indebted to Prof PG du Toit for his guidance in writing this article.
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international law rules regarding immunities of State officials may or may not limit the ability of South African courts to exercise universal jurisdiction over international crimes committed in foreign States.
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